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We define the direct and reverse secret-key capacities of a memoryless quantum channel as the
optimal rates that entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocols can reach by using a
single forward classical communication (direct reconciliation) or a single feedback classical com-
munication (reverse reconciliation). In particular, the reverse secret-key capacity can be positive
for antidegradable channels, where no forward strategy is known to be secure. This property is
explicitly shown in the continuous variable framework by considering arbitrary one-mode Gaussian
channels.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.–p, 89.70.Cf
Since the birth of quantum information [1], both the
notions of quantum entanglement and memoryless quan-
tum channel have been fundamental in many theoretical
investigations. This consideration is particularly true in
the field of quantum cryptography. On the one hand,
entanglement distribution is a basic process in the for-
mulation of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols
[2]. On the other hand, memoryless quantum channels
can be seen as the effect of collective attacks, recognized
as predominant in quantum cryptography after the re-
cent achievements of Ref. [3]. In this paper, we con-
sider a generic QKD protocol where two honest parties
(Alice and Bob) extract a secret key from the remote
correlations that are generated by one of the parties (Al-
ice) after the distribution of a generic entangled state
over a memoryless quantum channel. Such a task can
be assisted by one-way classical communications (CCs)
which can be forward, i.e., from Alice to Bob, or feed-
back, i.e., from Bob to Alice. Even if the scenario can
seem symmetric, it is actually much harder to study the
feedback-assisted protocols and optimize the correspond-
ing secret-key rates. The reason relies on the fact that Al-
ice can actively exploit the information already received
from Bob for conditioning the subsequent inputs to the
quantum channel. In this paper we simplify this prob-
lem by restricting the feedback to a single (and therefore
final) CC from Bob. Although we make this restriction
on the feedback strategy, the security performance is still
remarkable. Under suitable conditions, the correspond-
ing QKD protocols are in fact able to outperform all the
known QKD protocols which are based on forward CCs.
In general, we identify the notions of direct and reverse
reconciliation [4] with the ones of assistance by a single
forward and a single feedback CC, respectively. Then,
by optimizing over corresponding protocols, we define
the direct and reverse secret-key capacities of a quan-
tum channel. In direct reconciliation, the optimization
over a single forward CC is not restrictive at all. In fact,
the direct secret-key capacity represents an equivalent
entanglement-based formulation of the (forward) secret-
key capacity of Ref. [5]. In reverse reconciliation, even
if the feedback strategy is limited, the security perfor-
mance is in any case outstanding. In fact, the reverse
secret-key capacity can be positive even if the quantum
channel is antidegradable [6], i.e., an eavesdropper is able
to reconstruct completely the output state of the receiver
(and no forward protocol is known to be secure). This
property is explicitly shown in the most important sce-
nario for the continuous variable QKD: the one-mode
Gaussian channel. In order to establish this result in
its full generality, we resort to the recent canonical clas-
sification of the one-mode Gaussian channels [7] (see also
Refs. [8, 9]). By assuming an arbitrary one-mode Gaus-
sian channel, we then exploit a general lower bound for
the reverse secret-key capacity. This bound corresponds
to the additive capacity of Ref. [10], which is connected to
the entanglement distillation by feedback CCs. For one-
mode Gaussian channels, this additive capacity assumes
an analytical formula which is exceptionally simple. Most
importantly, it enables us to prove the positivity of the re-
verse secret-key capacity over a wide range of parameters
where the channel is antidegradable. In a final investiga-
tion, we also prove that tighter bounds can be derived by
exploiting noise effects in the key-distribution process.
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FIG. 1: Quantum channel N and its dilation.
Let us consider an arbitrary quantum channel, i.e.,
a completely positive trace-preserving (CPT) map N ,
transforming the input state ρA′ of a sender (Alice) into
the output state ρB of a receiver (Bob). As depicted in
Fig. 1, such a channel can always be represented by an
2isometric embedding UN : HA′ → HB⊗HE followed by a
trace over the environment E which we identify with the
eavesdropper (Eve). By definition, the original channel
N is called degradable if there exists a CPT map D such
that ρE = D(ρB), where ρE is the output state of Eve.
By contrast, N is called antidegradable if there exists a
CPT map D˜ such that ρB = D˜(ρE). A further dilation
of the quantum channel is provided by the purification
of the input ρA′ = TrAΦ with Φ := |Φ〉 〈Φ|AA′ , involving
the introduction of a supplementary system A at Alice’s
side. Notice that the three output systems A,B and E
are globally described by a pure state Ψ = |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|ABE ,
which is given by Ψ = (IA⊗UN )(Φ). A key-distribution
protocol can be introduced by extending the scenario of
Fig. 1 to n (entangled) uses of the channel and by adding
measurements to Alice’s and Bob’s sides. Restricting the
honest users to a single one-way CC, we have a one-way
key-distribution protocol which can be direct, if Alice as-
sists Bob, or reverse, if Bob assists Alice.
Let us begin with the direct protocol. In the first
step of this protocol, Alice distributes a pure entangled
state Φn := |Φ〉 〈Φ|AnA′n sending the A
′-part through
the memoryless quantum channel N⊗n = N ⊗ · · · ⊗ N
(see Fig. 2). As a consequence, we have a pure state
Ψn = (IA⊗ UˆN )
⊗n(Φn), shared by the output systems of
Alice (An), Bob (Bn) and Eve (En). On her local sys-
tems An, Alice performs a quantum measurement MA.
This is generally described by a positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) {Aˆx} with outcomes x. As a result, she
gets an output random variable X = {x, p(x)} where the
values x have probability distribution p(x) = Tr(ΨnAˆx).
After the measurement, Alice processes X via a classi-
cal channel X → (SA, L), which yields a key variable
SA = {s, p(s)} and an assisting variable L = {l, p(l)}.
The assisting variable L contains all the information nec-
essary to Bob for performing error correction and privacy
amplification. The value l of L is then broadcast by Alice
through a public channel. Using this information, Bob
performs a conditional POVM MB|L = {Bˆ
(l)
s } on his
systems Bn, and retrieves an estimation of Alice’s key
S′A up to an error probability p(SA 6= S
′
A) ≤ ε [11].
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FIG. 2: Key-distribution protocol in direct reconciliation.
In the limit of n→ +∞, Alice and Bob are able to rule
out Eve completely and share exactly the same uniform
key SA corresponding to H(SA) := nR secret bits. The
highest secret-key rate R which is achievable by direct
protocols over a quantum channel N is called the direct
secret-key capacity K◮(N ) of the channel. This quantity
is characterized by the formula [12, 13]
K◮(N ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Φn,MA
X→T
[I(X : Bn|T )− I(X : En|T )] ,
where the maximum is over all the pure states Φn, Al-
ice’s POVMs MA, and all the classical channels p(t|x) :
X → T generating the conditioning dummy variable T .
In this formula, I(X : Bn|T ) and I(X : En|T ) are the
conditional Holevo information of Bob and Eve [14]. In
direct reconciliation, one can show [13] that the condi-
tioning by T can actually be avoided in the previous for-
mula, and thatK◮(N ) is the entanglement-based version
of the secret-key capacity K(N ) of Ref. [5]. From Ref. [5]
it is known that K(N ) ≥ E(N ) = Q(N ), where E(N )
is the entanglement-generation capacity of N and Q(N )
its unassisted quantum capacity [15].
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FIG. 3: Key-distribution protocol in reverse reconciliation.
A key-distribution protocol in reverse reconciliation,
i.e., a reverse protocol, consists of interchanging Alice
and Bob in terms of the assisting CC while keeping Alice
as dispenser of the quantum state Φn. As we have al-
ready mentioned, this is a particular case of a more gen-
eral feedback-assisted protocol, where Alice distributes
the entangled state Φn in n different rounds, each one
conditioned by previous CCs received from Bob. In the
first step of a reverse protocol, Alice distributes Φn gen-
erating Ψn as before (see Fig. 3). But now the first
measurement is done by Bob, who detects his systems
Bn via a POVM MB, generating an output variable
Y = {y, p(y)}. Again, this variable is processed into
a key variable SB and an assisting variable M , which is
broadcast by Bob. Using this information, Alice subjects
her local systems An to a conditional POVMMA|M , re-
trieving an estimation of Bob’s key S′B up to a small error
probability. The reverse secret-key capacity K◭(N ) of a
quantum channel N is defined as the highest secret-key
rate which is achievable by reverse protocols over N . For
this capacity we can prove the upper bound [12, 13]
K◭(N ) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Φn,MB
Y→T
[I(Y : An|T )− I(Y : En|T )] ,
where the maximum is now over Bob’s POVMsMB and
involves the processing of Bob’s variable Y .
In order to find achievable lower bounds for this ca-
pacity, let us restrict the process of key-distribution to
the one of key-distillation. A one-way key-distillation
3protocol over a channel N (in direct or reverse recon-
ciliation) is defined as a one-way key-distribution pro-
tocol where the input state is separable over different
uses of the channel, i.e., Φn = Φ⊗n. Maximizing over
these protocols, we can define the direct and reverse key-
distillation capacities of a quantum channel, that we de-
note by K⊗◮(N ) and K
⊗
◭(N ). These capacities clearly
satisfy K⊗◮(N ) ≤ K◮(N ) and K
⊗
◭ (N ) ≤ K◭(N ). Using
the results of Ref. [16], we can easily prove the formu-
las [12, 13]
K⊗
◮
(N ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Φ,MA
X→T
[I(X : Bn|T )− I(X : En|T )] ,
K⊗
◭
(N ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
Φ,MB
Y→T
[I(Y : An|T )− I(Y : En|T )] ,
where now the maximization is over the single copy of the
state Φ, i.e., over Φ⊗n. Exploiting the relation with the
key-distillation, we can prove an important lower bound
for K◭(N ). In fact, we have [13]
K◭(N ) ≥ K
⊗
◭
(N ) ≥ E
(1)
R (N ) = ER(N ) , (1)
where ER(N ) is the additive capacity of Ref. [10]. In
particular, the single-letter version of this capacity is
given by the formula E
(1)
R (N ) := max|Φ〉 I(A〈B), where
I(A〈B) := H(ρA) − H(ρAB) is the reverse coherent in-
formation computed over Alice and Bob’s output state
ρAB = (IA ⊗ N )(Φ). Remarkably, ER(N ) has a very
different behavior with respect to the quantum capacity
Q(N ). In particular, for an antidegradable channel, we
can have ER(N ) > 0 which implies K◭(N ) > 0. In the
following this is explicitly shown for a generic Gaussian
channel affecting a single bosonic mode.
Recall that a bosonic mode is a quantum system de-
scribed by a pair of quadrature operators, qˆ and pˆ, with
[qˆ, pˆ] = 2i. Then, a Gaussian channel G acting on this
system is a CPT map which preserves the Gaussian
statistics of its states. Using the compact formulation
of Ref. [8], every G can be associated with three symplec-
tic invariants: transmission τ , rank r, and temperature
n¯. These invariants completely characterize the unique
canonical form [7] C(τ, r, n¯) which is unitarily equivalent
to G (see Fig. 4). For a generic one-mode Gaussian chan-
nel G with transmission τ 6= 1, we compute [13]
ER(G) = max
{
0, log
∣∣∣∣ 11− τ
∣∣∣∣− g(n¯)
}
, (2)
where g(x) := (x+1) log(x+1)−x logx. This expression
must be compared with
Q(1,g)(G) = max
{
0, log
∣∣∣∣ τ1− τ
∣∣∣∣− g(n¯)
}
, (3)
which is the quantum capacity Q(G) restricted to a sin-
gle use of the channel and pure Gaussian states [17]. It
is known that Q(G) = Q(1,g)(G) for a degradable chan-
nel [18], while Q(G) = 0 for an antidegradable channel.
In order to analyze and compare the previous quantities,
we introduce the scaled thermal noise ε := 2n¯ |1− τ |.
For every τ 6= 1, we then consider the minimal noises,
εQ and εR, above which we have Q
(1,g)(G) = 0 and
ER(G) = 0, respectively. The corresponding threshold
curves εQ = εQ(τ) and εR = εR(τ) are shown in Fig. 5.
For τ ≤ 1/2, the one-mode Gaussian channel is known to
be antidegradable [7] and, therefore, we have Q(G) = 0.
In this case, no forward protocol is known to be secure,
i.e., it is not known if K(G)[= K◮(G)] 6= 0. However,
for 0 < τ ≤ 1/2 and ε < εR(τ), we have a wide re-
gion of antidegradability where ER(G) > 0 and, there-
fore, K◭(G) > 0. In other words, even if Eve can recon-
struct Bob’s state, Alice and Bob are still able to extract
a secret key using a reverse protocol. This result is a
remarkable feature of the reverse reconciliation, which is
here stated in its full generality by considering arbitrary
one-mode Gaussian channels.
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FIG. 4: Canonical decomposition. In the center of the
figure (Eve), we show the decomposition of a one-mode Gaus-
sian channel G into a canonical form C(τ, r, n¯) up to a pair of
unitaries Uˆ and Uˆ ′. Noisy reverse protocol. The reverse
protocol with the rate of Eq. (4) is achieved by applying two
inverse unitaries Uˆ−1 and Uˆ ′−1 (not shown in the figure), re-
stricting the quantum distribution to a two-mode squeezed
vacuum state Φ = |µ〉 〈µ|, and providing Alice and Bob with
homodyne detectors (see boxes in the figure). In particular,
Bob’s homodyne detector is placed after one of the two out-
put ports of a balanced beam-splitter mixing the signal with
the vacuum (the output of the other port is discarded).
As a final investigation, we prove an effective separa-
tion between K◭ and ER, i.e., the existence of tighter
lower bounds for K◭. In particular, we show a reverse
key-distillation protocol whose rate R◭ can outperform
ER(G), so that we have K
⊗
◭(G) 6= ER(G) and, there-
fore, K◭(G) 6= ER(G). This protocol exploits a noisy
decoding measurement as in Ref. [19] and works as fol-
lows. For every G, Alice and Bob can in principle apply
two input-output unitaries that put G in canonical form.
Assuming this reduction, Alice distributes n copies of a
two-mode squeezed vacuum state |µ〉 〈µ| with variance µ
[20]. At the output of the channel, Bob’s measurement
setup consists of a balanced beam-splitter followed by a
random homodyne detection of qˆ or pˆ, as shown in Fig. 4.
The corresponding outcomes are classically processed to
provide the two variables SB and M . Then, Bob broad-
casts the value of the assisting variable M , containing
4also the correct sequence of qˆ and pˆ detections. As a
consequence, Alice performs the same sequence of ho-
modyne detections on her systems An and then applies
error-correction and privacy amplification to get her es-
timation of the key S′B. In the limits for n → +∞ and
µ → +∞ (and for τ 6= 1), the honest users achieve the
secret-key rate
R◭ = max
{
0, 12 log
λ
|1−τ | + g
(√
w
4λ −
1
2
)
− g(n¯)
}
, (4)
where λ := (|1− τ |+w)/(1+ |1− τ |w) and w := 2n¯+1.
Let us denote by ε◭ = ε◭(τ) the security threshold cor-
responding to R◭ = 0. As shown in Fig. 5, there is a
whole region for 0 < τ < 2 and εR < ε < ε◭, where
R◭ > ER(G) = 0. As a consequence, we generally have
K⊗◭(G) 6= ER(G) and, therefore,K◭(G) 6= ER(G). Notice
that when G is just a canonical form, the previous pro-
tocol can be implemented in practice, without the help
of any quantum memory. Alice and Bob can in fact per-
form their detections step-by-step and then keep only the
data measured in the same basis (qˆ or pˆ). In this case
the rate R◭ of Eq. (4) refers to the sifted-key after the
basis reconciliation.
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FIG. 5: Scaled thermal noise ε versus transmission τ 6= 1.
The thin solid curve εQ = εQ(τ ) refers to Q
(1,g)(G), while the
thick solid curve εR = εR(τ ) refers to ER(G). Above (below)
these curves the corresponding capacities are zero (positive).
Notice that ER(G) is positive in the region 0 < τ ≤ 1/2 and
ε < εR(τ ), where the channel is antidegradable. The dashed
curve ε◭ = ε◭(τ ) corresponds to R◭ = 0, where R◭ is the
rate given in Eq. (4).
In conclusion, we have introduced the notions of direct
and reverse secret-key capacities of a quantum channel,
specifying these notions for key-distillation too. In par-
ticular, the reverse capacities K◭ and K
⊗
◭ extend the
concept of reverse reconciliation to a completely general
scenario, where this procedure must be intended as a
classical assistance by means of a single feedback CC.
Such reverse capacities are lower bounded by an additive
quantity ER, which is connected with entanglement dis-
tillation and has been explicitly computed for one-mode
Gaussian channels. For these channels, we have shown
that the property of antidegradability does not necessar-
ily preclude the possibility to extract a secret key. This
is proven in full generality without any restriction on the
Gaussian model. In other words, we have not restricted
the one-mode Gaussian channel to any specific descrip-
tion like, e.g., a beam-splitter with a thermal input. In
this general scenario, we have also shown an explicit pro-
tocol which proves an effective separation between K◭
and ER. In future works, our results can be exploited for
exploring the ultimate cryptographic properties of arbi-
trary quantum channels.
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